E

433

BANCROFT

LIBRARY

<•

THE LIBRARY

OF

THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA

SPEECH

o.

OF

Avv\e»le(

HON.HSrA. DOUGLAS, OF ILLINOIS,

AGAIHT3T

THE ADMISSION OF KANSAS

UNDER

THE LECOMPTON CONSTITUTION-

DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 22, 1858.

WASHINGTON:

' 1858.

•XL

SPEECH

The Senate having under consideration the bill for the admission of Kansas as a Stats
into the Union —

Mr. DOUGLAS said :

Mr. PRESIDENT: I know not that my strength is sufficient to en
able me to present to-night the views which I should like to submit
upon the question now under consideration. My sickness for the last
two weeks has deprived me of the pleasure of listening to the debates,
and of an opportunity of reading the speeches that have been made ;
hence I shall not be able to perform the duty which might naturally
have been expected of me, of replying to any criticisms that may have
been presented upon my course, or upon my speeches, or upon my re
port. I must content myself with presenting my views upon the
questions that are^ naturally brought up by the bill under considera
tion. I trust, however, that I may be pardoned for referring briefly,
in the first instance, to my course upon the slavery question during
the period that I have had a seat in the two Houses of Congress.

When I entered Congress, in 1843, I found upon the statute-book
the evidence of a policy to adjust the slavery question and avoid sec
tional agitation by a geographical line drawn across the continent,
separating free territory from slave territory. That policy had its
origin at the beginning of this government, and had prevailed up to
that time. In 178*7, while the convention was in session, forming the
Constitution of the United States, the Congress of the Confederation
adopted the ordinance of 1787, prohibiting slavery in all the territory
northwest of the Ohio river. The first Congress that assembled under
the Constitution extended all the provisions of that ordinance, with
the exception of the clause prohibiting slavery, to the territory south
of that river, thus making the Ohio river the dividing line between
free territory and slave territory, free labor and slave labor.

Subsequently, after the acquisition of Louisiana, when Missouri, a
portion of that territory, applied for admission into the Union as a
State, the same policy was carried out by adopting the parallel of 36°
30' north latitude, from the western border of Missouri, as far west
ward as our territory then extended, as the barrier between free ter
ritory upon the one side, and slave territory upon the other.

Thus the question stood when I first entered the Congress of the
United States. I examined the question when the proposition was
made for the annexation of Texas, in 1845 ; and though I was unable
io vindicate the policy of a geographical line upon sound political
principles, still, finding that it had been in existence from the begin
ning of the government, had been acquiesced in up to that time by

the North and by the Sjouth, and that it had its origin in patriotic
motives, I was anxious to abide by and perpetuate that policy rather
than open the slavery agitation, and create sectional strife and heart
burning by attempting to restore the government to those great prin
ciples which seemed to me to be more consistent with the right of
self-government, upon which our institutions rest. For this reason I
cordially acquiesced, in 1845, in the insertion into the resolutions for
the annexation of Texas, of a clause extending the Missouri compro
mise line through the Kepublic of Texas so fa«r westward as the new
acquisition might reach. I not only acquiesced in and supported the
measure then, but I did it with the avowed purpose of continuing that
line to the Pacific ocean, so soon as we should acquire the territory.
Accordingly, in 1848, when we had acquired New Mexico, Utah, and
California, from the Kepublic of Mexico, and the question arose in
this body in regard to the kind of government which should be estab
lished therein, the Senate, on my motion, adopted a proposition to
extend the Missouri compromise line to the Pacific ocean, with the
same understanding with which it was originally adopted. The
Journal of the Senate contains the following entry of that proposition :

"On motion of Mr. DOUGLAS to amend the bill, section fourteen, line one, by inserting'
after the word 'enacted:' 'That the line of 3G° 30' of north latitude, known as the
Missouri compromise line, as denned by the eighth section of an act entitled "An act to*
authorize the people of the Missouri Territory to form a constitution and State govern
ment, and for the admission of said State into the Union on an equality with the original
States, and to prohibit slavery in certain Territories," approved March 6, 1820, be, and
the same is hereby, declared to extend to the Pacific ocean, and the said eighth section,
together with the compromise therein effected, is hereby revived, and declared to be in-
full force and binding for the future organization of the Territories of the United States,
in the same sense and with the same understanding with which it was originally adopted/

"It was determined in the affirmative — yeas 32, nays 21.

"On motion of Mr. BALDWIN, the yeas and nays being desired by one- fifth of the.
senators present,

"Those who voted in the affirmative are —

"Messrs. Atchison, Badger, Bell, Benton, Berrien, Borland, Bright, Butler, Calhoun,
Cameron, Davis of Mississippi, Dickinson, Douglas, Downs, Fitzgerald, Foote, Hannegan,,
Houston, Hunter, Johnson of Maryland, Johnson of Louisiana, Johnson of Georgia,
King, Lewis, Mangum, Mason, Metcalfe, Pearce, Sebastian, Spruance, Sturgeon, Turneyr
and Underwood.

"Those who voted in the negative are —

"Messrs. Allen, Atherton, Baldwin, Bradbury, Breese, Clarke, Corwin, Davis of Massa
chusetts, Payton, Dix, Dodge, Felch, Green, Hale, Hamlin, Miller, Nijes, Phelps,
Upham, Walker, and Webster.

" So the proposed amendment was agreed to."

Thus it will be seen that the proposition offered by me to extend the
Missouri compromise line to the Pacific ocean in the same sense and with
the same understanding with which itwas originally adopted, was agreed
to by the Senate t>y a majority of twelve. When the bill was sent to
tbe House of Representatives, that provision was stricken out, I think,
by thirty-nine majority. By that vote the policy of separating free
territory from slave territory, by a geographical line, was abandoned
by the Congress of the United States. It is not my purpose on this
occasion to inquire whether the policy was right or wrong ; whether
its abandonment at that time was wise or unwise ; that is a question
long since consigned to history, and I leave it to that tribunal to de
termine. I only refer to it now for the purpose of showing the view
which I then took of the question. It will be seen, by reference to

the votes in the (Senate and House of Representatives, that southern
men in a body voted for the extension of the Missouri compromise
line, and a very large majority of the northern men voted against it.
The argument then made against the policy of a geographical line was
one which upon principle it was difficult to answer. It was urged that
if slavery was wrong north of the line, it could not he right south of
the line ; that if it was unwise, impolitic, and injurious on the one side, it
could not he wise, politic, and judicious upon the other ; that if the
people should be left to decide the question for themselves on the one
side, they should be entitled to the same privilege on the other. I
thought these arguments were difficult to answer upon principle. The
only answer urged was, that the policy had its origin in patriotic mo
tives, in fraternal feeling, in that brotherly affection which ought to
animate all the citizens of a common country ; and that, for the sake
of peace and harmony and concord, we ought to adhere to and pre
serve that policy. Under these considerations, I not only voted for it,
but moved it, and lamented as much as any man in the coun
try its failure ; because that failure precipitated us into a sectional
strife and agitation, the like of which had never before been witnessed
in the United States, and which alarmed the wisest, the purest, and
the best patriots in the land for the safety of the Republic.

You all recollect the agitation which raged through this land from
1848 to 1850, and which was only quieted by the compromise meas
ures of the latter year. You all remember how the venerable sage and
patriot of Ashland was called forth from his retirement for the sole
purpose of being able to contribute, by his wisdom, by his patriotism,
by his experience, by the weight of his authority, something to calm
the troubled waters, and restore peace and harmony to a distracted
country. That contest waged fiercely, almost savagely, threatening
the peace and existence of the Union, until at last, by the wise coun
sels of a Clay, a Webster, and a Cass, and the other leading spirits of
the country, a new plan of conciliation and settlement was agreed
upon, which again restored peace to the Union. The policy of a geo
graphical line separating free territory from slave territory was aban-
boned by its friends only because they found themselves without the
power to adhere to it, and carry it into effect in good faith. If that
policy had been continued, if the Missouri line had been extended to
the Pacific ocean, there would have been an end to the slavery agita
tion forever — for on one side as far west as the continent extended slavery
would have been prohibited, while on the other, by legal implication,
it would have been taken for granted that the institution of slavery
would have existed and continued, and emigration would have sought
the one side of the line or the other, as it preferred the one or the
other class of domestic and social institutions. I confess, sir, that it
was my opinion then, and is my opinion now, that the extension of
that line would have been favorable to the Soufch, so far as any sec
tional advantage would have been obtained, if it be an advantage to any
section to extend its peculiar institutions. Southern men seemed so to
consider it, for they voted almost unanimously in favor of that policy
of prohibiting slavery on one side, contented with a silent implication
in its favor on the other. Northern representatives and senators

seemed to take the same view of the subject, for a large majority of
them voted against this geographical policy, and in lieu of it insisted
upon a law prohibiting slavery everywhere within the Territories of
the United States, north as well as south of the line ; and not only in
the Territories, but in the dock yards, the navy yards, and all other
public places over which the Congress of the United States had exclu
sive jurisdiction.

Such, sir, was the state of public opinion, as evidenced by the acts
of representatives and senators on the question of a geographical line
by the extension of the Missouri compromise, as it is called, from 1848
to 1850, which caused it to be abandoned, and the compromise mea
sures of 1850 to be substituted in its place. Those measures are
familiar to the Senate and to the country. They are predicated upon
the abandonment of a geographical line, and upon the great principle
of self-government in the Territories, and the sovereignty of the States
over the question of slavery, as well as of over all other matters of
local and domestic concern. Inasmuch as the time-honored and vene
rated policy of a geographical line had been abandoned, the great
leaders of the Senate, and the great Commoners in the other House of
Congress, -saw no other remedy but to return to the true principles of
the Constitution — to those great principles of self-government and
popular sovereignty upon which all free institutions rest — and to
leave the people of the Territories and of the States free to decide the
slavery question, as well as all other questions, for themselves.

Mr. President, I am one of those who concurred cheerfully and
heartily in this new line of policy marked out by the compromise
measures of 1850. Having been compelled to abandon the former
policy of a geographical line, for want of ability to carry it out, I
joined with the great patriots to whom I have alluded, to calm and
quiet the country by the adoption of a policy more congenial to my
views of free institutions, not only for the purpose of healing and
harmonizing the strife and controversy which then existed, but for
the further purpose of providing a rule of action in all time to come
which would avoid sectional strife and sectional controversy in the
future. It was one of the great merits of the compromise measures
of 1850 — indeed, it was their chief merit — that they furnished a prin
ciple, a rule of action which should apply everywhere, north and
south of 36° 30', not only to the territory which we then had, but to
all that we might afterwards acquire, and thus, if that principle was
adhered to, prevent any strife, any controversy, any sectional agita
tion in the future. The object was to localize, not to nationalize, the
controversy in regard to slavery, to make it a question for each State
and each Territory to decide for itself, without any other State, or
any other Territory, or the federal government, or any outside power,
interfering, directly or indirectly, to influence or control the result.

My course upon those measures created, at first, great excitement,
and I may say great indignation, at my own home, so that it became
necessary for me to go before the people and vindicate my action. I
made a speech at Chicago upon my return home, in which I stated
the principles of the compromise measures of 1850 as I have now
stated them here, and vindicated them to the best of my ability. It

is enough to say that, upon sober reflection, the people of Illinois ap
proved the course which I then pursued ; and when the legislature
came together, they passed, with great unanimity, resolutions endors
ing emphatically the principle of those measures.

In 1854, when it became necessary to organize the Territories of
Kansas and Nebraska, the question arose, what principle was to apply
to those Territories ? It was true they both lay north of the line of
36° 30' ; but it was also true that, four years before, the policy of a
geographical line had been abandoned and repudiated by the Con
gress of the United States, and in lieu of it the plan of leaving each
Territory free to decide the question for itself had been adopted. I
felt it to be my duty, as a senator from the State of Illinois, and I
will say as a member of the democratic party, to adhere in good
faith to the principles of the compromise measures of 1850, and to
apply them to Kansas and Nebraska, as well as to the other Terri
tories. To show that I was bound to pursue this course, it is only
necessary to refer to the public incidents of those times. In the
presidential election of 1852, the great political parties of that day
each nominated its candidate for the presidency upon a platform
which endorsed the compromise measures of 1850, and both pledged
themselves to carry them out in good faith in all future times in the
organization of all new Territories. The whig party adopted that
platform at Baltimore, and placed General Scott, their candidate,
upon it. The democratic party adopted a platform identical in prin
ciple,, so far as this question was concerned, and elected General
Pierce President of the United States upon it. Thus the whig party
and the democratic party each stood pledged to apply this principle
in the organization of all new Territories. Not only was I as a dem
ocrat — as a senator who voted for their adoption — bound to apply
their principle to this case ; but, as a senator from Illinois, I was
under an imperative obligation, if I desired to obey the will and carry
out the wishes of my constituents, to apply the same principle. To
show the views of my legislature upon that subject, I will read one
resolution, which was passed at the session of 1851 :

" Resolved, That our liberty and independence are based upon the right of the people to
form for themselves such a government as they may choose ; that this great privilege, the
birthright of freemen, the gift of Heaven, secured to us by the blood of our ancestors, ought
to be extended to future generations ; and that no limitation ought to be applied to this
power in the organization of any Territory of the United States, of either a territorial gov
ernment or a State constitution : Provided, The government so established shall be repub
lican, and in conformity with the Constitution."

That resolution was adopted by a vote of sixty-one in the affirma
tive and only four in the negative. I undertake to say that resolu
tion spoke the sentiments of the people of Illinois ; and I, as their
senator, was only carrying out their sentiments and wishes by apply
ing this principle to the Territories of Kansas and Nebraska. This
principle was appled in that bill in the precise language of the com
promise measures of 1850, except the addition of a clause removing
from the statute-book the eighth section of the Missouri act, as being
inconsistent with that principle, and declaring that it was the true
intent and meaning of the act not to legislate slavery into any Ter
ritory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people

thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions
in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the- United
States.

Now, sir, the question arises whether the Lecompton constitution,
which has been presented here for our acceptance, is in accordance
with this principle embodied in the compromise measures, and clearly
defined in the organic act of Kansas. Have the people of Kansas
been left perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institu
tions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution? Is the
Lecompton constitution the act and deed of the people of Kansas ?
x Does it embody their will ? If not, you have no constitutional right
to impose it upon them. If it does embody their will, if it is
their act and deed, you have, then, aright to waive any irregularities
that may have occurred, and receive the State into the Union. This
is the main point, in my estimation, upon which the vote of the
Senate and of the House of Kepresentatives ought to depend in the
decision of the Kansas question. Now, is there a man within the
hearing of my voice who believes that the Lecompton constitution
does embody the will of a majority of the bona fide inhabitants of
Kansas ? Where is the evidence that it does embody that will ?

We are told that it was made by a convention assembled at Lecomp
ton in September last, and has been submitted to the people tor rati
fication or rejection. How submitted? In a manner that allowed
every man to vote for it, but precluded the possibility of any man voting
against it. We are told that there is a majority of about five thousand
five hundred votes recorded in its favor under these circumstances. I
refrain from going into the evidence which has been taken before the
commission recently held in Kansas to show what proportion of these
votes were fraudulent ; but, supposing them all to have been legal,
bona fide residents, what does that fact prove, when the people on that
occasion were allowed only to vote for, and could not vote against,
the constitution? On the other hand, we have a vote of the people in
pursuance of law, on the 4th of January last, when this constitution
was submitted by the legislature to the people for acceptance or rejec
tion, showing a majority of more than ten thousand against it. If
you grant that both these elections were valid, if you grant that the
votes were legal and fair, yet the majority is about two to one against
this constitution. Here is evidence to my mind conclusive that this
Lecompton constitution is not the embodiment of the popular will of
Kansas. How is this evidence to be rebutted ? By the assumption
that the election on the 21st of December, where the voters were
allowed to vote for it, but not against it, was a legal election ; and that
the election on the 4th of January, where the people were allowed to
vote for or against the constitution as they chose, was not a legal and
valid election.

Sir, where do you find your evidence of the legality of the election
of the 21st of December? Under what law was that election held?
Under no law, except the decree of the Lecompton convention. Did
that convention possess legislative power ? Did it possess any author
ity to prescribe an election law? That convention possessed only
such power as it derived from the territorial legislature in the act
authorizing the assembling of the convention ; and I submit that the

9

same authority, the same power, existed in the territorial legislature
to order an election on the 4th of January as existed in the conven
tion to order one on the 21 et of December. The legislature had the
same power over the whole subject on the 17th of December, when it
passed a law for the submission of the constitution to the people, that
it had on the 19th of February, when it enacted the statute for the
assembling of the convention.

The convention assembled under the authority of the ^territorial
legislature alone, and hence was bound to conduct all its proceedings
in conformity with, and in subordination to, the authority of the
legislature. The moment the convention attempted to put its consti
tution into operation against the authority of the territorial legisla
ture, it committed an act of rebellion against the government of the
United States. But we are told by the President that at the time the
territorial legislature passed the law submitting the whole constitution
to the people, the Territory had been prepared for admission into the
Union as a State. How prepared? By what authority prepared?
Not by the authority of any act of Congress — by no other authority
than that of the territorial legislature; and clearly a convention
assembled under that authority could do no acfrto subvert the territo
rial legislature which brought the convention into existence.

But gentlemen assume that the organic act of the Territory was an
enabling act ; that it delegated to the legislature all the power that
Congress had to authorize the assembling of a convention. Although
I dissent from this doctrine, I am willing, for the sake of the argu
ment, to assume it to be correct ; and if it be correct, to what conclu
sion does it lead us ? It only substitutes the territorial legislature
for the authority of Congress, and gives validity to the convention \
and therefore the legislature would have just the same right that
Congress otherwise would have had, and no more, and no less. Sup
pose now that Congress had passed an enabling act, and a convention1
had been called, and a constitution framed under it ; but three days
before that constitution was to take effect, Congress should pass-
another act repealing the convention law, and submitting the consti
tution to the vote of the people : would it be denied that the act of
Congress submitting the constitution would be a valid act ? If Con
gress would have authority thus to interpose, and submit the consti
tution to the vote of the people, it clearly follows that if the legislature
stood in the place of Congress, and was vested with the power which
Congress had on the subject, it had the same right to interpose, and
submit this constitution to the people for ratification or rejection.

Therefore, sir, if you judge this constitution by the technical rules
of law, it was voted down by an overwhelming majority of the people
of Kansas, and it became null and void ; and you are called upon
now to give vitality to a void, rejected, repudiated constitution. If,
however, you set aside the technicalities of law, and approach it in
the spirit of statesmanship, in the spirit of justice and of iairness,
with an eye single to ascertain what is the wish and the will of that
people, you are forced to the conclusion that the Lecompton constitu
tion does not embody that will.

Sir, we have heard the argument over and over aga:n, that the
Lecompton convention were justified in withholding this constitution

10

from submission to the people, for the reason that it would have been
voted down if it had been submitted to the people for ratification or
rejection. We are told that there was a large majority of free State
men in the Territory, who would have voted down the constitution if
they had got a chance, and that is the excuse for not allowing the
people to vote upon it. That is an admission that this constitution is
not the act and deed of the people of Kansas ; that it does not embody
their will ; and yet you are called upon to give it force and vitality ;
to make it the fundamental law of Kansas with a knowledge that it
is not the will of the people, and misrepresents their wishes. I ask
you, sir, where is your right, under our principles of government, to
force a constitution upon an unwilling people ? You may resort to all
the evidence that you can obtain, from every source that you please,
and you are driven to the same conclusion. (The confusion created
by the large number of persons in the galleries endeavoring to find
places where they could see and hear, and others pressing in, was so
great that the honorable senator could hardly make himself heard.)

Mr. STUART. I am aware of the very great difficulty of preserving
order ; but still I think that, by a suggestion from the Chair, gentle
men in the galleries and about the lobbies would do it. They can do
it if they will. The honorable senator from Illinois speaks with dif
ficulty, at any rate, and I hope there will be sufficient order preserved
that he may be heard.

The YICE PRESIDENT. The Chair has observed a good deal of dis
order about the central door of the main gallery. It is quite obvious
that there are as many persons there as can stand now, and therefore
it would be well for gentlemen not to press in. They are respectfully
requested to preserve order and decorum.

Mr. DOUGLAS. If further evidence was necessary to show that the
Lecompton constitution is not the will of the people of Kansas, you
find it in the action of the legislature of that Territory. On the first
Monday in October an election took place for members of the territo
rial legislature. It was a severe struggle between the two great
parties in the Territory. On a fair test, and at the fairest election, as
is conceded on all hands, ever held in the Territory, a legislature
was elected. That legislature came together and remonstrated, by an
overwhelming majority, against this constitution, as not being the act
and deed of that people, and not embodying their will. Ask the late
governor of the Territory, and he will tell you that it is a mockery to
call this the act and deed of the people. Ask the secretary of the
Territory, ex-governor Stanton, and he will tell you the same thing.
I will hazard the prediction, that if you ask governor Denver to-day,
he will tell you, if he answers at all, that it is a mockery, nay, a
crime, to attempt to enforce this constitution as an embodiment of the
will of that people. Ask, then, your official agents in the Territory ;
ask the legislature elected by the people at the last election ; con
sult the poll-books on a fair- election held in pursuance of law ;
consult private citizens from there ; consult whatever sources of in
formation you please, and you get the same answer — that this con
stitution does not embody the public will, is not the act and deed of
the people, does not represent their wishes ; and hence I deny your

11

right, your authority, to make it their organic law. If the Lecomp-
toD constitution ever becomes the organic law of the State of Kansas,
it will be the act of Congress that makes it so, and not the act or will
of the people of Kansas. v

But we are told that it is a matter of but small moment whether
the constitution embodies the public will or not, because it can be mod
ified and changed by the people of Kansas at any time as soon as
they are admitted into the Union. Sir, it matters not whether it can
be changed or cannot be changed, so far as the principle involved is
concerned. It matters not whether this constitution is to be the per
manent fundamental law of Kansas, or is to last only a day, or a
month, or a year ; because, if it is not their act and deed you have no
right to force it upon them for a single day. If you have the power
to force it upon this people for one day, you may do it for a year, for
ten years, or permanently. The principle involved is the same. It
is as much a violation of fundamental principle, a violation of popular
sovereignty, a violation of the Constitution of the United States, to
force a State constitution on an unwilling people for a day, as it is for
a year or for a longer time. When you set the example of violating
the fundamental principles of free government, even for a short period,
you have made a precedent that will enable unscrupulous men in fu
ture times, under high partisan excitement, to subvert all the other
great principles upon which our institutions rest.

But, sir, is it true that this constitution may be changed imme
diately by the people of Kansas ? The President of the United States
tells us that the people can make and unmake constitutions at pleasure ;
that the people have no right to tie their own hands and prohibit a
change of the constitution until 1864, or any other period ; that the
right of change always exists, and that the change may be made by
the people at any time in their own way, at pleasure, by the consent
of the legislature. I do not agree that the people cannot tie their
own hands. I hold that a constitution is a social compact between all
the people of the State that adopts it ; between each man in the State,
and every other man ; binding upon them all ; and they have a right
to say it shall only be changed at a particular time and in a particular
manner, and then only after such and such periods of deliberation.
Not only have they a right to do this, but it is wise that the funda
mental law should have some stability, some permanency, and not be
liable to fluctuation and change by every ebullition of passion.

This constitution provides that, after the year 1864 it may be
changed by the legislature by a two-thirds vote of each house, sub
mitting to the people the question whether they will hold a convention
for the purpose of amending the constitution. I hold that, when a
constitution provides one time of change, by every rule of interpreta
tion it excludes all other times ; and when it prescribes one mode of
change, it excludes all other modes. I hold that it is the fair intend-
ment and interpretation of this constitution that it is not to be changed
until after the year 1684, and then only in the manner prescribed in
the instrument. If it were true that this constitution was the act and
deed of the people of Kansas — if it were true that it embodied their
will — I hold that such a provision against change for a sufficient

12

length of time to enable the people to test its practical workings would
be a wise provision, and not liable to objection. That people are not
capable of self-government who cannot make a constitution under
which they are willing to live for a period of six years without change.
I do not object that this constitution cannot be changed until after
1864, provided you show me that it be the act and deed of the people,
and embodies their will now. If it be not their act and deed, you
have no right to fix it upon them for a day — not for an hour — not for
an instant ; for it is a violation of the great principle of free govern
ment to force it upon them.

The President of the United States tells us that he sees no objection
to inserting a clause in the act of admission declaratory of the right
of the people of Kansas, with the consent of the first legislature, to
change this constitution, notwithstanding the provision which it con
tains, that it shall not be changed until after the year 1864. Where
does Congress get power to intervene and change a provision in the
constitution of a State? If this constitution declares, as I insist it
does, that it shall not be changed until after 1864, what right has
Congress to intervene, to alter, or annul that provision prohibiting
alteration? If you can annul one provision, you may another, and
another, and another, until you have destroyed the entire instrument.
I deny your right to annul ; I deny your right to change, or even to
construe the meaning of a single clause of this constitution. If it be the
act and deed of the people of Kansas, and becomes their fundamen
tal law, it is sacred ; you have no right to touch it, no right to con-
.strue it, no right to determine its meaning ; it is theirs, not yours.
You must take it as it is, or reject it as a whole ; but put not your
•jsacriligious hands upon the instrument if it be their act and deed.
Whenever this government undertakes to construe State constitutions
and to recognize the right of the people of a State to act in a different
manner from that provided in their constitution ; whenever it under
takes to give a meaning to a clause of a State constitution, which that
State has not given ; when'ever the government undertakes to do that,
and its right is acknowledged, farewell to State rights, farewell to
.State sovereignty ; your States become mere provinces, dependencies,
with no more independence and no more rights than the counties of
the different States. This doctrine, that Congress may intervene,
and annul, construe, or change a clause in a State constitution, sub
verts the fundamental principles upon which our complex system of
government rests.

Upon this point, the Committee on Territories, in the majority re
port, find themselves constrained to dissent from the doctrine of the
President. They see no necessity, and, if I understand the report, no
legal authority on the part of Congress to intervene and construe this
or any other provision of the constitution ; but the distinguished gen
tleman who makes the report from the Committee on Territories has,
in his own estimation, obviated all objection by finding a clause in the
constitution of Kansas, which he thinks remedies the whole evil. It
is in the bill of rights, and is in these words :

" All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded OD
their authority, and instituted for their benefit ; and, therefore, they have at all times an in-

13

alienable and ndefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish their form of government in such
•a manner as they may think proper."

The VICE PRESIDENT. The senator from Illinois will pause for a
moment. The Sergeant-at-arms will go up and close the centre door
-of the ladies' gallery ; shut it, and keep it shut, so as to admit no
more persons there.

Mr. DOUGLAS. There appears to be some difficulty at the southern
door of the eastern gallery, and I hope the Chair will direct that to
be closed.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair has sent an officer to that door to
close it, and preserve quiet there. The senator from Illinois will
proceed.

Mr. DOUGLAS. The senator from Missouri, who makes the report of
the majority of the committee, is under the impression that this clause
in the bill of rights overrides and changes the provision in the Le-
compton constitution, which declares that there shall be no change
until after 1864, and then only by a two-thirds vote of the legislature.
How does he make that override the prohibition ? By taking the
clause in the bill of rights, which is intended only to assert abstract
rights that may be exercised by the people when driven to the last
resort, to wit : to revolution. That is an abstract principle, intended
to assert the right in the people of Kansas to change their form of
government, under the same law, the same authority that our ancestors
resisted British power, and overthrew the British authority upon this
continent. It was under that principle that our fathers threw the tea
into Boston harbor. It was under that principle that our fathers
burnt up the stamps, and sent the stamp agents out of the country.
It was under that principle that our fathers resorted to arms to main
tain the right to change their form of government from a monarchy
to a republic — change by revolution, because they had arrived at the
point where resistance was a less evil than submission. That the
people have a right to appeal to the God of arms to overthrow the
power that oppresses them, and change their form of government
whenever their oppressions are intolerable, and resistance is a less evil
than submission, is a great truth that no republican, no democrat, no
citizen of a free country, should ever question. But, sir, that clause
was never intended to furnish the lawful mode by which this consti
tution could be changed, for the reason that the same instrument
points out a different mode than the one therein asserted ; and when
a specific mode is prescribed, and time is to elapse before that mode
can be resorted to> that excludes the idea that it can be done in any
other mode, or at a prior time.

But, sir, this article from the bill of rights proves entirely too
much. The President says you may put into this bill a clause recog
nizing the right of the people of Kansas to change their constitution
by the consent of the first legislature. What does the bill of rights
say ? That it is the inalienable and indefeasible right of the people,
at al'l times, to alter, abolish, or reform their form of government in
such manner as they may think proper, not in such manner as the
legislature shall prescribe, not at such time as the legislative authority
or the existing government may provide, but in such manner as the

14

people think proper in town meeting, in convention, through the leg
islature, in popular assemblages, at the point of the bayonet, in any
manner the people themselves may determine. That is the right and
the nature of the right authorized by this bill of rights. It is the
revolutionary remedy, not the lawful mode. There are two modes of
changing the constitution of a State ; one lawful, the other revolu
tionary. The lawful mode is the one prescribed in the instrument.
The revolutionary mode is one in violation of the instrument. The
revolutionary mode may be peaceful, or may be forcible ; that depends
on whether there is resistance. If a people are unanimous in favor of
a change, if nobody opposes it, the revolutionary means may be a
peaceful remedy ; but if, in the progress of the revolution, while you
are making the change, you meet with resistance, then it becomes
civil war, treason, rebellion, if you fail, and a successful revolution if
you succeed.

I say, then, the mode pointed out in the bill of rights is the revo
lutionary mode, and not the lawful means provided in the instrument ;
but if the Committee on Territories be right in saying that this is
a lawful mode, then the recommendation of the President, that Con
gress should recognize the right to do it by the first legislature, vio
lates this constitution. Why? The President recommends us to
recognize their rights through the legislature, and in that mode alone.
The bill of rights says the people shall do it in such manner as they
please. If the construction given by the Committee on Territo
ries be right, you dare not vote for the President's proposition to
recognize the right of the first legislature to do it, for you give a con
struction to the instrument in violation of its terms.

Mr. HAMMOND. Will the senator from Illinois allow me to inter
rupt him a moment ?

Mr. DOUGLAS. With a great deal of pleasure.
Mr. HAMMOND. I understood the senator to say just now that Con
gress had no right to look into the constitution of a State and place
a construction upon it. If that be true, I would inquire of the senator
from Illinois, how is Congress to know whether a constitution is re
publican or not ? If it be true, I would inquire of him, further, why is
he here now discussing and placing a construction upon the constitu
tion of Kansas?

Mr. DOUGLAS. I will take great pleasure in answering the gentle
man from South Carolina. I have a right to look into this constitu
tion to see whether, in my opinion, it is republican. I have this right
to look at it only for the purpose of regulating my vote. The judg
ment on which I base my vote is one binding on nobody but myself. I
am talking now, not on forming a construction by which members of
Congress are to govern themselves, but I am speaking of your right to
place a construction on this constitution binding upon the people and
government of Kansas. Give me the power to construe the constitu
tion of Kansas authoritatively, and then I have the power to change
it, to alter it, to annul it, to make it mean what I please, and not
what they mean.

Mr. HAMMOND. I should have thought that the senator would have
denounced the attempt to construe the constitution, and left the mat-

ter there, after having asserted that no such power exists ; but when
he goes on to construe it himself, he is inconsistent with his first prop
osition that there is no right to construe it.

Mr. DOUGLAS. No, sir, I deny the right of Congress to con
strue it authoritatively for the people of Kansas. I am not denying
the right of the senator from of South Carolina to put his own con
struction upon it. I am not denying the right of each senator here
to make up his own mind in regard to it. It is the duty of each
senator here to do that for himself ; but that is only to satisfy his own
judgment and his own conscience in regulating his vote upon the
question. The point I am arguing is, whether this Congress has
any power, by a rule of construction, to change the constitution
of a State, and make its construction binding on the authori
ties and people of that State. I repeat, if this Congress can exercise
that power, there is an end of State rights, an end of State sovereignty;
this government becomes a consolidated government, an empire, a
central power, with provinces and dependencies, and ceases to be a con
federation of sovereign and independent States. I am arguing against
the propriety of Congress acceding to the recommendation of the
President to strike that fatal blow at the severeignty of the States of
this Union.

But, sir, my friend from Ohio, who cannot accede quite to this doc
trine of the President any more than the Committee on Territories
can, proposes to remedy this matter in a different way. He has offered
an amendment, which I ask the Clerk to read.

The Clerk read the following amendment, intended to be proposed
l>y Mr. PUGH, to the amendment intended to be proposed by Mr.
GREEN to the bill (S. No. 161) " for the admission of the State of
Kansas into the Union : At the end thereof add the following section :

" SEC . — . And be it further enacted, That the admission of the States of Minnesota and
Kunsas into the Union, by this act, shall never be so construed as to deny, limit, or other
wise impair, the right of tJie people of the said States, with the assent of their legislatures,
severally, at all times, to alter, reform, or abolish their form of government, in such manner
as they may think proper, so that the same be still republican and in accordance with the
Constitution of the United States. "

•• Mr. DOUGLAS. I am at a loss to know what object my friend from
Ohio expects to accomplish by this proviso, that nothing in the act of
admission shall be construed to deny, limit, or otherwise impair, the
right of the people to change their constitution. Who ever dreamed
that there was anything in the act of admission which could be so
construed? It is not the act of admission to which we are alluding ;
it is the provision in this constitution which says it shall not be
changed until after 1864.

Nobody pretends that you can put anything in the act of admission
which would limit this right. What I am denying is your right to
put anything in the act of admission either to limit or extend or con
strue the constitution. Nobody pretends that this act of admission
affects this point at all. The objection, if it be an objection, is in the
constitution itself, not in the act of admission.

Then what legal effect would the amendment of the senator from
Ohio have, if it should be adopted ? I presume no one pretends that
it would have any legal effect. Is there a senator here who pretends

16

that the adoption of the amendment of the senator from Ohio would
confer any power or authority on the people of Kansas' to change their
constitution which they would not have without it ? I am informed
the senator from Ohio said, in his speech in explanation of it, that it
did not confer any right which the people would not otherwise have.
Then why adopt it? I can conceive of but one motive, and that is to
lead the people to infer that they have secured a right by that proviso
which they really have not got — to lead them to suppose that they
have gained an advantage which in reality they do not possess. Is
that the object? Is it the object to obviate an objection, and yet in
fact to leave the objection in full force ? Why, I ask, is it proposed
to put that amendment in the bill if it has no legitimate effect — if it
does not give the people any right, any privilege, which they would
not possess without it? Perhaps I may be asked, on the contrary,
what is the objection to putting it in? It may be said it is only the
expression of the individual opinion of the members of Congress. I
will tell you my objection to putting this clause in the act of admis
sion. I object to inserting any clause in the act of admission that
expresses any opinion, one way or the other, in respect to the pro
priety of any provision in the constitution. If you may pronounce
judgment on the propriety ofs one clause, although it has no legal
effect to change it, you may on the propriety of another clause. Sup
pose, for instance, the senator from New York should offer an amend
ment that nothing contained in this act of admission shall be con
strued to sanction or tolerate the right to hold property in man ; or
that nothing herein contained shall be construed to authorize or permit
slaveholding in said State ; or should propose to insert an opinion that
slaveholding was a crime ; would southern men think there was no
objection to it because it had no legal effect ? Are you willing that
Congress shall set the example of inserting, in acts of admission,
clauses that pronounce judgment against the domestic institutions of
a State? Are you willing that a Congress composed of a majority of
free-State men shall put clauses in an act of admission condemning
slaveholding ? Or, if we were a minority, would we be willing that
you should put a clause in an act of admission condemning our free
institutions ?

Now, sir, I hold that Congress has no right to pronounce its opinion
even upon the propriety of any local or domestic institution of any
State of this Union. Each State is sovereign, with the unlimited and
unrestricted power and right to manage its local and internal concerns
to suit itself, subject only to the limitations of the Constitution of the
United States. I warn gentlemen that when, in order to catch a little
popular favor, they set the example of backing up a vote in favor of
this enormous fraud by putting a clause in the bill having no legal
effect, but expressing opinions upon the propriety of this or that clause
of a State constitution, they are setting an example that may return
upon them in a way that will not be pleasant. I protest against Con
gress interfering either to annul or construe, or express opinions upon
the propriety of this clause or that clause of the constitution. I repeat,^
if the constitution be the act and deed of the people of Kansas, and if
its provisions are not in violation of the Constitution of the United

17

States, that people had a right to put them there ; and you have no-
right to touch them or to pronounce judgment upon them.

Mr. President, I come back to the question : ought we to receive
Kansas into the Union with the Lecompton constitution ? Is there
satisfactory evidence that it is the act and deed of that people ? that
it embodies their will ? Is the evidence satisfactory that the people
of that Territory have been left perfectly free to form and regulate
their domestic institutions in their own way? I think not. I do not
acknowledge the propriety, or justice, or force of that special pleading
which attempts, by technicalities, to fasten a constitution upon a peo
ple which, it is admitted, they would have voted down if they had had
a chance to do so, and which does not embody their will. Let me ask
gentlemen from the south, if the case had been reversed, would they
have taken the same view of the subject ? Suppose it were ascertained,
beyond doubt or cavil, that three-fourths of the people of Kansas were
in favor of a slaveholding State, and a convention had been assembled
by just such means and under just such circumstances as brought the
Lecompton convention together ; and suppose that when they assem
bled it was ascertained that three-fourths of the convention were free-
soilers, while three-fourths of the people were in favor of a slaveholding
State ; suppose an election took place in the Territory during the sitting
of the convention, which developed the fact that the convention did not
represent the people ; suppose that convention of free-soilers had pro
ceeded to make a constitution and allowed the people to vote for it,
but not against it, and thus forced a free-soil constitution upon a-
slaveholding people against their will — would you, gentlemen from
the south, have submitted to the outrage? Would you have come up
here and demanded that the free-soil constitution — adopted at an
election where all the affirmative votes were received, and all the
negative votes rejected, for the reason that it would have been voted
down if the negative votes had been received — should be accepted ?
Would you have said that it was fair, that it was honest, to force an
abolition constitution on a slaveholding people against their will ?
Would you not have come forward and have said to us that you denied
that it was the embodiment of the public will, and demanded that it
should be sent back to the people to be voted upon, so as to ascertain
the fact ? Would you not have said to us that you were willing to
live up to the principle of the Nebraska bill, to leave the people per
fectly free to form such institutions as they please ; and that if we
would only send that constitution back and let the people have a fair
vote upon it, you would abide the result? Suppose we, being a
northern majority, had said to you : "No ; we have secured a sectional
advantage and we intend to hold it ; and we will force this constitu
tion upon an unwilling people, merely because we have the power to
do it ;" would you have said that was fair?

Mr. HAMMOND. Will the senator allow me to answer him ?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Certainly.

Mr. HAMMOND. As the senator looked towards me in asking his
question, I will undertake, though without authority, to answer for
the slaveholding community. If, having had the power to establish
a slaveholding constitution, we had refrained from exercising it, and

18

those in favor of a free State constitution had established one to that
effect, I say that the slaveholders would have submitted to it, until
through the forms of constitutional law they could have altered it.

Mr. DOUGLAS. The senator assumes what I did not certainly intend,
when he says that I looked at him. I was propounding the question,
however, to any senator, and am as willing that the senator from
South Carolina should reply as any other. He assumes as true, for
the purposes of his answer, the very fact that is denied — that they had
the power.

Mr. HAMMOND. Asserted on all hands, sir.

Mr. DOUGLAS. What ?

Mr. HAMMOND. Asserted that there was a free State majority when
the convention was elected.

Mr. BROWN. The senator from Illinois asserted it to-night.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes ; and I assert now that there was a free State
majority ; and I assert, also, that one half the counties of the Terri
tory were disfranchised, and not allowed to vote at the election of
delegates. (Applause in the galleries.)

Mr. HAMMOND. That has been answered over and over again

The VICE PRESIDENT. The senator from South Carolina will pause
until order is restored.

Mr. MASON. I rise to a question of privilege. If there is again
disorder in this chamber, I shall insist upon the galleries being cleared.

Mr. BROWN. I hope that order will be enforced. The Senate is not
a theatre.

Mr. TOOMBS. The statement just made by the senator from Illinois
is a great mistake, and I shall take issue with him when he sits down.
I say it is not true in any sense, and I will answer it.

Mr. MASON. Mr. President

The VICE PRESIDENT. The senator from Virginia gives notice that
if there be a repetition of the demonstrations in the galleries he will
move to clear them.

Mr. MASON. If there is again disorder in the galleries, let it arise
from what source it may, I shall ask the Chair to enforce the order of
the Senate.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Before the debate commenced, the Chair ex
pressed the hope that these demonstrations would not occur. He did
not then think that he would have to repeat the expression of that
hope. This floor is covered by persons not members of the Senate,
admitted by the consent of the body unanimously, and certainly
something is due to the courtesy of the Senate. The Chair does not
believe these demonstrations will be repeated, and therefore takes no
further notice of what has occurred. The senator from Illinois will
proceed.

Mr. DOUGLAS. The interposition of the denial that about one half of
the counties were disfranchised, I presume, can have but very little
weight on the argument. It has been proven over and over again. In
my estimation the proof is conclusive as to the fifteen counties, and
satisfactory, I think, as to nineteen, being half the counties of the
Territory, that there was not such a census and registration as author
ized a vote for delegates. It has been attempted to be proved, how-

19

ever, that there was not a great many votes in those counties. I
believe the president of the convention estimates that there were not
more than fifteen hundred or two thousand in those counties. Sup
pose that was all. There were only a little over two thousand votes
polled at the election of delegates in the other nineteen counties which
elected all the delegates. If the disfranchised counties contained
fifteen hundred voters, is it not conclusive that, with the addition of
five or six hundred persons in the other counties, they could have
changed the result ? Having been disfranchised in one-half the coun
ties, the friends of those who were disfranchised may not have voted
in the other counties, because they had no hope of overcoming the ma
jority in the other half. I did not intend to go into the argument on
that point again ; and I should not have alluded to it now but for the
fact that the Senator from South Carolina had to assume as true, what
I understood not to be true, in order to predicate his answer upon it,
that he, as a southern man, would vote to admit the State if the case
had been reversed, and a free-State constitution was being forced upon
an unwilling people, with the knowledge that it did not reflect the
sentiments of that people.

Mr. HAMMOND. Allow me to say that, if the slaveholders, under
these circumstances, had never had a majority at all, they would,
nevertheless, have submitted unl/il they could alter the constitution,
if they could possibly do it.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I can only say, then, that they are a very submissive
people. [Daughter.]

Mr. HAMMOND. Not at all.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I have never seen the day when I would be willing
to submit to the action of a minority forcing a constitution on an un
willing people against their will because it had got an advantage. It
violates the fundamental principle of government ; it violates the
foundations on which all free government rests ; it is a proposition in
violation of the democratic creed ; in violation of the republ ican creed;
in violation of the American creed ; in violation of the creed of every
party which professes to be governed by the principles of free institu
tions and fair elections.

Mr. HAMMOND. Will the senator allow me to say one word more?
If the slaveholders, under the circumstances that he stated, were a mi
nority, they would have submitted. If they were a majority, as I
assume, they would have submitted until, under the forms of constitu
tional law, they could have properly asserted their power.

Mr. DOUGLAS". I understood the senator to say that ; I must say to
him that I would rather not repeat questions on the same point over
and over again. I am very feeble to-night, and shall probably not have
strength enough to go through with my remarks. I only desire to say
on that^oint, that I regard the principle involved here as vital and
fundamental, as lying at the foundation of all free government, and
the violation of it as a death blow to State rights and State sovereignty.
But, sir, I pass on. If you admit Kansas with the Lecompton con
stitution, you also admit her with the State government which
has been brought into existence under it. Is the evidence satisfac
tory that that State government has been fairly and honestly elected ?

26

Is the evidence satisfactory that the elections were fairly and honestly
held, and fairly and honestly returned ? You have all seen the evi
dence showing the fraudulent voting ; the forged returns, from pre
cinct after precinct, changing the result not only upon the legislative
ticket, but also upon the ticket for Governor and State officers. The
false returns in regard to Delaware Crossing, changing the complexion
of the Legislature, are admitted. The evidence is equally conclusive
as to the Shawnee precinct, the Oxford precinct, the Kickapoo pre
cinct, and many others,, making a difference of some three thousand
votes in the general aggregate, and changing the whole result of the
election. Yet, sir, we are called upon to admit Kansas with the State
government thus brought into existence not only by fraudulent voting,
but forged returns, sustained by perjury. The Senate well recollects
the efforts that I made before the subject was referred to the committee,
and since, to ascertain to whom certificates of election were awarded,
that we might know whether they were given to the men honestly
elected, or to the men whose elections depended upon forgery and
perjury. Can any one tell me now to whom those certificates have
been issued, if they have been issued at all ? Can any man tell me
whether we are installing, by receiving this State government, officers
whose sole title depends upon forgery, or those whose title depends
upon popular votes ? We have been calling for that information for
about three months, but we have called in vain. One day the rumor
would be that Mr. Calhoun would declare the free-State ticket elected,
and next day that he would declare the pro-slavery ticket elected. So
it has alternated, like the chills and fever, day after day, until within
the last three days, when the action of Congress became a little du
bious, when it was doubtful whether Northern men were willing to
vote for a State government depending on forgery and perjury, and
then we find that the president of the Lecompton convention addresses
a letter to the editor of the Star, a newspaper in this city, telling what
he thinks is the result of the election. He says it is true that he has
received no answer to his letters of inquiry to Governor Denver ; he
has no official information on the subject, but, from rumors and un
official information, he is now satisfied that the Delaware Crossing
return was a fraud ; that it will be set aside ; and that, accordingly,
the result will be that certificates will be issued to the free-State men.
I do not mean to deny that Mr. Calhoun may think such will be the
result ; but while he may think so, I would rather know how the fact
is. His thoughts are not important, but the fact is vital in establish
ing the honesty or dishonesty of the State government which we are
about to recognize. It so happens that Mr. Calhoun has no more
power, no more authority over that question now, than the Senator
from Missouri, or any other member of this body. The celebrated
Lecompton schedule provides that —

*' In case of removal, ABSENCE, or disability of the president of this convention to dis
charge the duties herein imposed on him, the president pro tempore of this convention shall
perform said duties ; and in case of absence, refusal, or disability of the president pro temporc,
a committee consisting of seven, or a majority of them, shall discharge the duties required
of the president of this convention."

As Mr. Calhoun is absent from the Territory, and, by reason of that
absence, is deprived of all authority over the subject-matter, and as

21

the president pro temporehsis succeeded to his powers, is it satisfactory
for the deposed president to address a letter to the editor of the Star
announcing his private opinion as to who has been elected ? I should
like to know who the president pro tempore is and where he is ; and if
he is in Kansas, whether he has arrived at the same conclusion which
the ex-president Calhoun has announced. I should like to know
whether that president pro fempore has already issued his certificate
to the pro-slavery men in Kansas, while Mr. Calhoun expresses the
opinion in the Star that the certificates will be issued to the free-State
men ? If that president pro tempore has become a fugitive from justice,
and escaped from the Territory, I should like then to know who are
the committee of seven that were to take his place ; and whether they,,
or a majority of them, have arrived at the same conclusion to which
Mr. Calhoun has come? Inasmuch as this opinion is published to
the world just before the vote is to be taken here, and is expected to
catch the votes of some green members of one body or the other, I
should like to know whether certificates have been issued ? and, if so,
by whom, and to whom ? where the president pro tempore is ? where
the committee of seven may be found ? and then we might know who
constitute the Legislature, and who constitute the State government,
which we are to bring into being. We are not only to admit Kansas
with a constitution, but with a State government ; with a governor,
a legislature, a judiciary ; with executive, legislative, judicial, and
ministerial officers. Inasmuch as we are told by the President, that
the first legislature may take steps to call a convention to change the
constitution, I should like to know of whom that legislature is com
posed ? Inasm fhe. governor would have the power to veto an
act of the legLv t ; g calling a convention, I should like to know who
is governor, so that I may judge whether he would veto such an act?
Cannot our good friends get the president pro tempore of the conven
tion to write a letter to the Star ? Can they not procure a letter from
the committee of seven ? Can they not clear up this mystery, and
relieve our suspicious minds of anything unfair or foul in the arrange
ment of this matter ? Let us know how the fact is.

This publication of itself is calculated to create more apprehension
then there was before. As long as Mr. Calhoun took the ground that
he would never declare the result until Lecompton was admitted, and
that if it was nr' admitted, he would never make the decision, there
seemed to be some reason in his course ; but when, after taking that
ground for months, it became understood that Lecompton was dead,
or was lingering and languishing, and likely to die, and when a few
more votes were necessary, and a pretext was necessary to be given,
in order to secure them, we find this letter published by the deposed
ex-president, giving his opinion when he had no power over the sub
ject ; and when it appears by the constitution itself that another man
or another body of men has the decision in their hands, it is calcu
lated to arouse our suspicions as to what the result will be after Le
compton is admitted.

Mr. President, in the course of the debate on this bill, before I was
compelled to absent myself from the Senate on account of sickness,
and I presume the same has been the case during my absence, much

22

was said on the slavery question in connection with the admission
of Kansas. Many gentlemen have lahored to produce the impression
that the whole opposition to the admission arises out of the fact that
the Lecompton constitution makes Kansas a slave State. I am sure that
no gentleman here will do me the injustice to assert or suppose that
my opposition is predicated on that consideration, in view of the fact
that my speech against the admission of Kansas under the Lecompton
constitution was made on the 9th of December, two weeks before
the vote was taken upon the slavery clause in Kansas, and when the
general impression was that the pro-slavery clause would be excluded.
I predicated my opposition then, as I do now, upon the ground that
it was a violation of the fundamental principles of government, a
violation of popular sovereignty, a violation of the Democratic plat
form, a violation of all party platforms, and a fatal blow to the inde
pendence of the new States. I told you then that you had no more
right to force a free-State constitution upon a people against their will
than you had to force a slave-State constitution. Will gentlemen say
that, on the other side, slavery has no influence in producing that
united, almost unanimous support which we find from gentlemen
living in one section of the Union in favor of the Lecompton consti
tution? If slavery had nothing to do with it, would there have been
so much hesitation about Mr. Calhoun's declaring the result of the
election prior to the vote in Congress? I submit, then, whether we
ought not to discard the slavery question altogether, and approach
the real question before us fairly, calmly, dispassionately, and decide
whether, but for the slavery clause, this Lecompton constitution could
receive a single vote in either House of Congress. Were it not for
the slavery clause, would there be any objection to sending it back to
the people for a vote ? Were it not for the slavery clause, would there
be any objection to letting Kansas wait until she had ninety thousand
people, instead of coming into the Union with not over forty-five or
fifty thousand ? Were it not for the slavery question, would Kansas
have occupied any considerable portion of our thoughts ? would it
have divided and distracted political parties so as to create bitter and
acrimonious feelings ? I say now to our southern friends, that I will
act on this question on the right of the people to decide for them
selves, irrespective of the fact whether they decide for or against
slavery, provided it be submitted to a fair vote at a fair election, and
with honest returns.

In this connection there is another topic to which I desire to allude.
I seldom refer to the course of newspapers, or notice the articles which
they publish in regard to myself ; but the course of the Washington
Union has been so extraordinary, for the last two or three months,
that I think it well enough to make some allusion to it. It has read
me out of the Democratic party every other day, at least, for two or
three months, and keeps reading me out, (laughter :) and, as if it had
not succeeded, still continues to read me out, using such terms as
" traitor/' " renegade," " deserter," and other kind and polite epi
thets of that nature. Sir, I have «no vindication to make of my de
mocracy against the Washington Union, or any other newspapers. I
willing am to allow my history and action for the last twenty years to

23

speak for themselves as to my political principles, and my fidelity to
political obligations. The Washington Union has a personal grievance.
When its editor was nominated for Public Printer I declined to vote
for him, and stated that at some time I might give my reasons for
doing so. Since I declined to give that vote, this scurrilous abuse,
these vindictive and constant attacks have been repeated almost daily
on me. Will my friend from Michigan read the article to which I
allude.

Mr. STUART read the following editorial article from the Washing
ton Union of November 17", 1857 :

FREE SOILISM. — The primary object of all government, in its original institution, is the pro
tection of person and property. It is for this alone that men surrender a portion of their
natural rights.

"In order that this object may be fully accomplished, it is necessary that this protection
should be equally extended to all classes of free citizens without exception. This, at
least, is a fundamental principle of the Constitution of the United States, which is the
original compact on which all our institutions are based.

"Slaves were recognized as property in the British colonies of North America by the
government of Great Britain, by the colonial laws and by the Constitution of the United
States. Under these sanctions vested rights have accrued to the amount of some sixteen
hundred million dollars. It is, therefore, the duty of Congress and the State legislature
to protect that property.

" The Constitution declares that ' the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.' Every citizen of one State
coming into another State has, therefore, a right to the protection of his person, and that
property which is recognized as such by the Constitution of the United States, any law of
a State to the contrary notwithstanding. So far from any State having a right to deprive
him of this property, it is its bounden duty to protect him in its possession.

" If these views are correct — and we believe it would be difficult to invalidate them — it
follows that all State laws, whether organic or otherwise, which prohibit a citizen of one
State from settling in another, and bringing his slave property with him, and most espe
cially declaring it forfeited, are direct violations of the original intention of a government
which, as before stated, is the protection of person and property, and of the Constitution
of the United States, which recognizes property in slaves, and declares that « the citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
States,' among the most essential of which is the protection of person and property,

"What is recognized as property by the Constitution of the United States, by a pro
vision which applies equally to all the States, has an inalienable right to be protected in
all the States." * * * * * * *

"The protection of property being, next to that of person, the most important object
of all good government, and property in slaves being recognized by the Constitution of
the United States, as well as originally by all the old thirteen States, we have never
doubted that the emancipation of slaves in those States where it previously existed, by an
arbitrary act of the legislature, was a gross violation of the rights of property."

" The emancipation of the slaves of the Northern States was then, as previously stated, a gross out
rage on the rights of property, inasmuch as it was not a voluntary relinquishment on the part
of the owners. It was an act of coercive legislation."

' ' This measure of emancipation was the parent or the offspring of a doctrine which may
be so extended as to place the property of every man in the community at the mercy of
rabid fanaticism or political expediency. It is only to substitute scruples of conscience
in place of established constitutional principle, and all laws and all constitutions become
a dead letter. The rights of persons and property become subservient, not to laws and
constitutions, but to fanatical dogmas, and thus the end and object of all good govern
ment is completely frustrated. There is no longer any rule of law nor any constitutional
guide ; and the people are left to the discretion, or rather the madness, of a school of
instructors who can neither comprehend their own dogmas nor make them comprehensible
to others." * * * * *

" Where is all this to end? and what security have the free citizens of the United States
that their dearest rights may not, one after another, be offered up at the shrine of the
demon of fanaticism, the most dangerous of all the enemies of freedom ? the Consti
tution is no longer to be our guide and protector, where shall we find barriers to defend
us against a system of legislation restrained by no laws and no constitutions, which
creates crimes at pleasure, punishes them at will, and sacrifices the rights of persons and

24

property to a dogma, or a scruple of conscience ? All this is but the old laws of Puritan
ism now fomenting and souring in the exhausted beer-barrel of Massachusetts. The
descendants of this race of ecclesiastical tyrants, or rather ecclesiastical slaves, have
spread over the western part of the State of New York, and throughout all the new States,
where they have, to some extent, disseminated their manners, habits, and principles, most
especially their blind subserviency to old idols, and their abject subjection to their priests.
There is no doubt that they aspire to give tone and character to the whole confederacy,
and believe that their dream will be realized ? We are pretty well convinced, however,
that the people of the United States will never become a nation of fanatical Puritans."

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, you here find several distinct proposi
tions advanced boldly by the Washington Union editorially and ap
parently authoritatively, and every man who questions any of them is
denounced as an abolitionist, a free-soiler, a fanatic. The proposi
tions are, first, that the primary object of all government at its original
institution is the protection of person and property ; second, that the
Constitution of the United States declares that the citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several States; and that, therefore, thirdly, all State laws,
whether organic or otherwise, which prohibit the citizens of one State
from settling in another with their slave property, and especially de
claring it forfeited, are direct violations of the original intention of
the government and Constitution of the United States ; and fourth,
that the emancipation of the slaves of the northern States was a gross
outrage on the rights of property, inasmuch as it was involuntarily
done on the part of the owner.

Remember that this article was published in the Union on the 1*7 th
of November, and on the 18th appeared the first article giving the
adhesion of the Union to the Lecompton constitution. It was in these
words :

"KANSAS AND HER CONSTITUTION. — The vexed question is settled. The problem is solved.
The dread point of danger is passed. All serious trouble to Kansas affairs is over and
gone."

and a column nearly of the same sort. Then, when you come to look
into the Lecompton constitution, you find the same doctrine incorpo
rated in it which was put forth editorially in the Union. What is it?

"ARTICLE 7. Section 1. The right of property is before and higher than any constitutional
sanction ; and the right of the owner of a slave to such slave and its increase is the same and
as inviolable as the right of the owner of any property whatever."

Then in the schedule is a provision that the constitution may be
amended after 1864 by a two-thirds vote,

" But no alteration shall be made to affect the right of property in the ownership of slaves.'

It will be seen by these clauses in the Lecompton constitution, that
they are identical in spirit with this authoritative article in the Wash
ington Union of the day previous to its indorsement of this constitu
tion, and every man is branded as a free-soiler and abolitionist who
does not subscribe to them. The proposition is advanced that the
emancipation acts of New York, of New England, of Pennsylvania,
and of New Jersey, were unconstitutional, were outrages upon the
right of property, were violations of the Constitution of the United
States. The proposition is advanced that a southern man has a right
to move from South Carolina, with his negroes, into Illinois, to settle
there and hold them there as slaves, anything in the constitution and
laws of Illinois to the contrary, notwithstanding. The proposition is,

that a citizen of Virginia lias rights in a free State, which a citizen of
a free State cannot himself have. We prohibit ourselves from hold
ing slaves within our own limits ; and yet, according to this doctrine,
a citizen of Kentucky can move into our State, bring in one hundred,
slaves with him, and hold them as such in defiance of the constitution
and laws of our own State. If that proposition is true, the creed r,f
the democratic party is false. The principle of the Kansas-Nebraska
bill is, that "each State and each Territory shall be left perfectly free
to form and regulate its domestic institutions in its own way, subject
only to the Constitution of the United States." I claim that Illinois
has the sovereign right to prohibit slavery, a right as undeniable as
that the sovereignty of Virginia may authorize its existence. We
have the same right to prohibit it that you have j*> recognize and
protect it. Each State is sovereign within its own sphere of powers,
sovereign in respect to its own domestic and local institutions and
internal concerns. So long as you regulate your local institutions to
suit yourselves, we are content ; but when you claim the right to
override our laws and our constitution, and deny our right to form
our institutions to suit ourselves, I protest against it. The same
doctrine is asserted in this Lecompton constitution. There, it is
stated that the right of property in slaves is " before and higher than
any constitutional sanction."

Mr. President, I recognize the right of the slaveholding States to
regulate their local institutions, to claim the services of their slaves
under their own State laws, and I am prepared to perform each and
every one of my obligations under the Constitution of the United
States in respect to them ; but I do not admit, and I do not think
they are safe in asserting, that their right of property in slaves is
higher than and above constitutional sanction, is independent of
constitutional obligations. When you rely upon the Constitution and
upon your own laws, you are safe. When you go beyond and above
constitutional obligations, I know not where your safety is. If this
doctrine be true, that slavery is higher than the Constitution, and
above the Constitution, it necessarily follows that a State cannot
abolish it, cannot prohibit it, and the doctrine of the Washington
Union, that the emancipation laws were outrages on the rights of
property, and violations of the Constitution, becomes the law.

When I saw that article in the Union of the 17th of November,
followed by the glorification of the Lecompton constitution on the
18th of November, and this clause in the constitution asserting the
doctrine that no State has a right to prohibit slavery within its
limits, I saw that there was a fatal blow being struck at the
sovereignty of the States of this Union, a death blow to^ State rights,
subversive of the democratic platform and of the principles upon
which the democratic party have ever stood, and upon which I trust
they ever will stand. Because of these extraordinary doctrines,
declined to vote for the editor of the Washington Union for public
printer : and for that refusal, as I suppose, I have been read out of
the party by the editor of the Union at least every other day from
that time to this. Sir, I submit the question : Who has deserved
democratic party and the democratic platform— he who stands by the

26

sovereign right of the State to abolish and prohibit slavery as
it pleases, or he who attempts to strike down the sovereignty of
the States, and combine all power in one central government, and
establish an empire instead of a confederacy ?

The principles upon which the presidential campaign of 1856 was
fought are well known to the country. At least, in Illinois, I think
I am authorized to state what they were with clearness and precision,
so far as the slavery question is concerned. The democracy of Illinois
are prepared to stand on the platform upon which the battle of 1856
was fought. It was —

First. The migration or importation of negroes into the country
having been prohibited since 1808, never again to be renewed, each
State will take care of its own colored population.

Second. That while negroes are not citizens of the United States,
and hence not entitled to political equality with whites, they should
enjoy all the rights, privileges, and immunities which they are capa
ble of exercising, consistent with the safety and welfare of the com
munity where they live.

Third. That each State and Territory must judge and determine for
itself of the nature and extent of its rights and privileges.

Fourth. That while each free State should and will maintain and
protect all the rights of the slaveholding States, they will, each for
itself, maintain and defend its sovereign right within its own limits,
to form and regulate their own domestic institutions in their own
way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States.

Fifth. That in the language of Mr. Buchanan's letter of acceptance
of the presidential nomination, the Nebraska-Kansas act does no more
than give the form of law to this elementary principle of self-govern
ment, when it declares " that the people of a Territory, like those of
a State, shall decide for themselves whether slavery shall or shall not
exist within their limits/'

These were the general propositions on which we maintained the
canvass on the slavery question — the right of each State to decide for
itself ; that a negro should have such rights as he was capable of en
joying, and could enjoy, consistently with the safety and welfare of
society ; and that each State should decide for itself the nature and
extent and description of those rights and privileges. Hence, if- you
choose in North Carolina to have slaves, it is your business, and not
ours. Jf we choose in Illinois to prohibit slavery, it is our right, and
you must not interfere with it. If New York chooses to give privi
leges to the negro which we withhold, it is her right to extend them,
but she must not attempt to force us to do the same thing. Let each
State take care of its own affairs, mind its own business, and let its
neighbors alone, then there will be peace in the country. Whenever
you attempt to enforce uniformity, and, judging that a peculiar insti
tution is good for you, and therefore good for everybody else, try to
force it on everybody, you will find that there will be resistance to the
demand. Our government was not formed on the idea that there was
to be uniformity of local laws or local institutions. It was founded

27

upon the supposition that there must be diversity and variety in the
institutions and laws. Our fathers foresaw that the local insti
tutions which would suit the granite hills of New Hamshire
would be ill adapted to the rice plantations of South Carolina.
They foresaw that the institutions which would be well adapted to the
mountains and valleys of Pennsylvania would not suit the plantation
interests of Virginia. They foresaw that the great diversity of cli
mate, of production, of interests, would require a corresponding diver
sity of local laws and local institutions. For this reason they provi
ded for thirteen separate States, each with a separate legislature, and
each State sovereign within in own sphere, with the right to make all
its local laws and local institutions to suit itself, on the supposition
that they would be as different and as diversified as the number of
States themselves. Then the general government was made, with a
Congress having limited and specified powers, extending only to those
subjects which were national and not local, which were federal and
not State.

These were the principles on which our institutions were established.
These are the principles on which the democratic party has ever fought
its battles. This attempt now to establish the doctrine that a free State
has no power to prohibit slavery, that our emancipation acts were uncon
stitutional and void, that they were outrages on the rights of property,
that slavery is national and not local, that it goes everywhere under
the Constitution of the United States, and yet is higher than the Con
stitution, above the Constitution, beyond the reach of sovereign
power, existing by virtue of that higher law proclaimed by the Sena
tor from New York, will not be tolerated. When the doctrine of a
higher law, a law above the Constitution, a law over-riding the Con
stitution, and imposing obligations upon public men in defiance of the
Constitution, was first proclaimed in the Senate, it was deemed moral
treason in this body ; but now I am read out of the party three times
a week by the Washington Union for disputing this higher law, which
is embodied in the Lecompton constitution, that slavery, the right to
slavery property, does not depend upon human law nor constitutional
sanction, but is above and beyond and before all constitutional sanc
tions and obligations ! I feel bound, as a Senator from a sovereign
State, to repudiate and rebuke this doctrine. I am bound as a Demo
crat, bound as an American citizen, bound as a Senator claiming to
represent a sovereign State, to enter my protest, and the protest of my
constituency, against such a doctrine. Whenever such a doctrine
shall be ingrafted on the policy of this country, you will have revolu
tionized the government, annihilated the sovereignty of the States,
established a consolidated despotism with uniformity of local institu
tions, and that uniformity being slavery, existing by Divine right,
and a higher law beyond the reach of the Constitution and of human
authority.

Mr. President, if my protest against this interpolation into the
policy of this country ," or the creed of the Democratic party is to
bring me under the ban, I am ready to meet the issue. I am told that
this Lecompton constitution is a party test, a party measure ; that no
man is a Democrat who does not sanction it, who does not vote to

28

bring Kansas into the Union with the government established under
that constitution. Sir, who made it a party test ? Who made it a
party measure ? Certainly the party has not assembled in convention
to ordain any such thing to be a party measure. I know of but one
State convention that has endorsed it. It has not been declared to be
a party measure by State conventions or by a national convention, or
by a senatorial caucus, or by a caucus of the Democratic members of
the House of Kepresentatives. How, then, came it to be a party meas-
sure ? The Democratic party laid down its creed at its last national
convention. That creed is unalterable for four years, according to the
rules and practices of the party. Who has interpolated this Lecomp-
ton constitution into the party platform ?

Oh ! but we are told it is an Administration measure. Because it is
an Administration measure, does it therefore follow that it is a party
measure ? Is it the right of an Administration to declare what are
party measures and what are not ? That has been attempted heretofore,
and it has failed. When John Tyler prescribed a creed to the Whig
party, his right to do so was not respected. When a certain doc
trine in regard to the neutrality laws was proclaimed to be a party
measure, my friends around me here considered it a " grave error,"
and it was not respected. When the army bill was proclaimed an Ad
ministration measure, the authority to make it so was put at defiance,
and the Senate rejected it by a vote of four to one, and the House of
Eepresentatives voted it down by an overwhelming majority. Is the
Pacific railroad bill a party measure ? I should like to see whether
the guillotine is to be applied to every recreant democrat who does not
come up to that test. Is the bankrupt law a party measure ? We shall
see, when the vote is taken, how many renegades there will be then.
Was the loan bill an administration measure, or a party measure? Is
the guillotine to be applied to every one who does not yield implicit
obedience to the behests of an administration in power ? There is
infinitely more plausibility in declaring each of the measures to which
I have just alluded to be an administration measure, than in declaring
the Lecompton constitution to be such. By what right does the
administration take cognizance of the Lecompton constitution ?

"Jhe Constitution of the United States says that "new States may be
admitted into the Union by the Congress ;" not by the President, not
by the cabinet, not by the administration. The Lecompton constitu
tion itself says, "this constitution shall be submitted to the Congress
of the United States at its next session ;" not to the President, not to the
cabinet, not to the administration. The convention in Kansas did not
send it to the administration, did not authorize it to be sent to the Presi
dent, but directed it to be sent to Congress ; and the President of the
United States only got hold of it through the commission of the surveyor
general, who was also president of the Lecompton convention. The
constitution as made was ordered to be sent directly to Congress ;
Congress having power to admit States, and the President having
nothing to do with it. The moment you pass a law admitting a State
it executes itself. It is not a law to be executed by the President or
by the administration. It is the last measure on earth that could be

29

rightfully made- an administration measure. It is not usual for the
constitution of a new State to come to Congress through the hand of
the President. True, the Minnesota constitution was sent to the
President because the convention of Minnesota directed it to he so sent;
and the President submitted it to us without any recommendation.
Because senators and representatives do not yield their judgments and
their consciences, and how in abject obedience to the requirements of
an Administration in regard to a measure on which the administration
are not required to act at all, a system of proscription, of persecution
is to be adopted against every man who maintains his self-respect, his
own judgment and his own conscience.

I do not recognize the right of the President or his cabinet,, no mat
ter what my respect may be for them, to tell me my duty in the senate
chamber. The President has his duties to perform under the Con
stitution ; and he is responsible to his constituency. A senator has
his duties to perform here under the Constitution and according to
his oath : and he is responsible to the sovereign State which he
represents as his constituency. A member of the House of Representa
tives has his duties under the Constitution and his oath ; and he is
responsible to the people that elected him. The President has no-
more right to prescribe tests to senators than senators have to the
President ; the President has no more right to prescribe tests to the
representatives than the representatives have to the President. Sup
pose we here should attempt to prescribe a test of faith to the President
of the United States, would he not rebuke our impertinence and im
pudence as subversive of the fundamental principle of the Constitu
tion ? Would he not tell us that the Constitution and his oath and
his conscience were his guide ; that we'must perform our duties, and
he would perform his, and let each be responsible to his own con
stituency ?

Sir, whenever the time comes that the President of the United States
can change the allegiance of the senators from the States to himself, what
becomes of the sovereignty of the States? When the time comes that a
senator is to account to the executive and not to his State, whom does
he represent ? If the will of my State is one way and the will of the
President is the other, am I to be told that I must obey the executive
and betray my State, or else be branded as a traitor to the party, and
hunted down by all the newspapers that share the patronage of the
government ? and every man who holds a petty office in any part of
my State to have the question put to him, " Are you Douglas*
enemy?" if not, "your head comes off." Why? " Because he is
a recreant senator ; because he chooses to follow his judgment and his
conscience, and represent his State instead of obeying my executive
behest." I should like to know what is the use of Congresses ; what
is tae use of Senates and Houses of Representatives, when their highest
duty is to obey the executive in disregard of the wishes, rights, and
honor of their constituents? What despotism on earth would be equal
to this, if you establish the doctrine that the executive has a right to
command the votes, the consciences, the judgment of the senators and
of the representatives, instead of their constituents? In old England,

30

whose oppressions we thought intolerable, an administration is hurled
from power in an hour when voted down hy the representatives of the
people upon a government measure. If the rule of old England ap
plied here, this cabinet would have gone out of office when the army
bill was voted down, the other day, in the House of Representatives.
There, in that monarchical country, where they have a queen by
divine right, and lords by the grace of God, and where republicanism
is supposed to have but a slight foothold, the representatives of the
people can check the throne, restrain the government, change the
ministry, and give a new direction to the policy of the government,
without being accountable to the king or the queen. There the re
presentatives of the people are responsible to their constituents.
Across the channel, under Louis Napoleon, it may be otherwise ; yet
I doubt whether it would be so boldly proclaimed there that a man is
a traitor for daring to vote according to his sense of duty, according to
the will of his State, according to the interests of his constituents.

Suppose the executive should tell the senator from California [Mr.
OWIN] to vote against his Pacific railroad bill ; would he obey ? If
not, he will be deemed a rebel. Suppose the executive should tell
the senator from Virginia [Mr. MASON] to vote for the Pacific railroad
bill, or the senator from Georgia [Mr. TOOMBS] to vote for the army
bill, or the senator from Mississippi [Mr BROWN] to sustain him on
the neutrality laws : we should have more rebels and more traitors.
But it is said a dispensation is granted, from the fountain of all power,
for rebellion on all subjects but one. The President says, in effect,
" Do as you please on all questions but one ;" that one is Lecompton.
On what principle is it that we must not judge for ourselves on this
measure, and may on everything else ? I suppose it is on the old
adage that a man needs no friends when he knows he is right,
and he only wants his friends to stand by him when he is wrong.
The President says that he regrets this constitution was not sub
mitted to the people, although he knows that if it had been sub
mitted it would have been rejected. Hence the President regrets
that it was not rejected. Would he regret that it was not submitted
and rejected if he did not think it was wrong ? And yet he demands
our assistance in forcing it on an unwilling people, and threatens
vengeance on all who refuse obedience. He recommends the army
bill ; he thinks it necessary to carry on the Mormon war, it is neces
sary to carry out a measure of the administration, and hence it is an
administration measure ; but he does not quarrel with anybody for
voting against it. He thinks every one of the other recommendations
to which I have alluded is right, and, therefore, there is no harm in
going against them. The only harm is in going against that which
the President acknowledges to be wrong ; and yet the system of pro
scription, to subdue men to abject obedience to executive will, is to be
pursued.

Is it seriously intended to brand every democrat in the United States
as a traitor who is opposed to the Lecompton constitution? If so, do
your friends in Pennsylvania desire any traitors to vote with them next
fall? We are traitors if we vote against Lecompton, our constituents

31

are traitors if they do not think Lecompton is right, and yet you expect
those whom you call traitors to vote with and sustain you. Are you to-
read out of the party every man who thinks it wrong to force a consti
tution on a people against their will ? If so, what will be the size of
the administration party in New York? what will it be in Pennsyl
vania? how many will it number in Ohio, or in Indiana, or in Illinois,
or in any other Northern State ? Surely you do not expect the support
of those whom you brand as renegades ! Would it not be well to allow
all freemen freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and freedom of ac
tion? Would it not be well to allow each senator and representative
to vote according to his judgment, and perform his duty according to-
his own sense of his obligation to himself, and to his State, and to his-
God?

For my own part, Mr. President, come what may, I intend to vote,
speak, and act, according to my own sense of duty, so long as I hold a-
seat in this Chamber. I have no defence of my democracy. I have no-
professions to make of my fidelity. I have no vindication to make of
my course. Let it speak for itself. The insinuation that I am acting
with the republicans, or Americans, has no terror, and will not drive
me from my duty or propriety. It is an argument for which I have
no respect. When I saw the senator from Virginia acting with the
republicans on the neutrality laws, in support of the President, I did
not feel it to be my duty to taunt him with voting with those to whom
he happened to be opposed in general politics. When I saw the senator
from Georgia acting with the republicans upon the army bill, it did
not impair my confidence in his fidelity to principle. When I see sen
ators here every day acting with the republicans on various questions,,
it only shows me that they have independence and self-respect enough
to go according to their own convictions of duty, without being influ
enced by the course of others.

I have no professions to make upon any of these points. I intend to
perform my duty in accordance with my own convictions. Neither the
frowns of power nor the influence of patronage will change my action,
or drive me from my principles. I stand firmly, immovably upon those
great principles of self-government and State sovereignty upon which
the campaign was fought and the election won. I stand by the time-
honored principles of the democratic party, illustrated by Jefferson and
Jackson, those principles of State rights, of State sovereignty, of strict
construction, on which the great democratic party has ever stood. I
will stand by the Constitution of the United States, with all its com
promises, and perform all my obligations under it. I will stand by
the American Union as it exists under the Constitution. ^ If, standing
firmly by my principles, I shall be driven into private life, it is a fate
that has no terrors for me. I prefer private life, -preserving my own
self-respect and manhood, to abject and servile submission to executive
will. If the alternative be private life or servile obedience to execu
tive will, I am prepared to retire. Official position has no charms for
me when deprived of that freedom of thought and action which be
comes a gentleman and a senator.

Mr. President, I owe an apology to the Senate for the desultory

manner in which. I have discussed this question. My health has been
so feeble for some time past that I have not been able to arrange my
thoughts, or the order in which they should be presented. If, in the
heat of debate, I have expressed a sentiment which would seem to be
unkind or disrespectful to any senator, I shall regret it. While I in
tend to maintain, firmly and fearlessly, my own views, far be it from
me to impugn the motives or question the propriety of the action of
any other senator. I take it for granted that each senator will obey
the dictates of his own conscience, and will be accountable to his con
stituents for the course which he may think proper to pursue.